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This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariﬀ barriers when
they are free to set tariﬀs but they do when tariﬀs are determined cooperatively. We then
show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from using tariﬀs
only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second,
there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the
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characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.
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It is commonplace to recognize that the use of tariﬀs has gradually been replaced by the
use of non-tariﬀ barriers (hereafter, NTBs). Some authors go even further and argue there is
a “Law of Constant Protection” (an expression used by Bhagwati (1988) mainly to dismiss
the idea). Baldwin (1984) for instance writes: “Not only have these measures become more
visible as tariﬀs have declined signiﬁcantly through successive multilateral trade negotiations
but they have been used more extensively by governments to attain the protectionist goals
formerly achieved with tariﬀs”(p. 600).
The purpose of this paper is to set up a model in which the eﬀect of trade liberalization
on the use of quotas and antidumping laws can be investigated directly. We analyze two
types of bilateral trade liberalization: tariﬀ reductions and quota elimination. The model is
a two-country model with two-way trade. We show three results. First, the model exhibits
ac l e a rprogression from the use of tariﬀs only to the use of quotas (following tariﬀ liberal-
ization), to the use of antidumping laws (when quotas have been jointly tarriﬁed). Second,
there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each of these instruments is used.
Third, the extent of bilateral tariﬀ liberalization and the ensuing degree of replacement of
tariﬀs by NTBs are determined by the combination of two industry-speciﬁc characteristics:
the government’s preferences for domestic ﬁrm proﬁts and the importance of international
transport cost in the industry. Overall, our results support the view that treaties that re-
move or reduce one type of distortion may lead to the use of other policies that are even
worse, but, despite the use of NTBs, overall trade is more liberal.
We believe that these results track well three separate sets of empirical facts. First,
evidence shows that there is a clear emergence of quantitative restrictions in the 1960s in
manufacturing sectors and in developed economies followed by an explosion in the use of
antidumping constraints since the 1980s. The emergence of these two NTBs can be linked to
preceding multilateral trade rounds. Second, despite a large number of antidumping cases, it
appears that the number of sectors aﬀected is small compared to those that were aﬀected by
quantitative restrictions that in turn is smaller than the number aﬀected by tariﬀs. Finally,
the results of this paper can be linked to the empirical literature on tariﬀ liberalization and
the emergence of NTBs. In particular, Marvel and Ray (1983) and Ray (1981, 1987) have
shown that, in some sectors, a net increase in protection has resulted from the emergence
of NTBs, and that the degree of replacement, as well as the extent of tariﬀ liberalization,
critically depend on the characteristics of the industry.
There is an abundant theoretical literature on NTBs. Papers investigating why, for
instance, a government might prefer quantitative restrictions to tariﬀs include Cassing and
Hillman (1985), Deardorﬀ (1987), Falvey and Lloyd (1991), Kaempfer et al. (1988). As
pointed out by McCulloch (1987), these papers do not explain the changes from tariﬀs to quo-
tas, let alone the changes to other forms of NTBs such as antidumping restrictions. Recently,
Anderson (1992, 1993) and Rosendorf (1996) have argued that antidumping constraints and
quantitative restrictions might go hand in hand. For instance, Rosendorf proposes a model
where a VER replaces a tariﬀ when a government cares about electoral returns and the in-
ﬂuence of ﬁrms’ proﬁts on these returns is strong enough. Antidumping actions may then be
1used to signal to foreign ﬁrms this desire to trade VER and tariﬀ. Although this mechanism
is interesting, this approach implies that the substitution toward NTBs necessarily increases
net protection and that the multilateral trading arrangement has less to do with this sub-
stitution than with a change in electoral returns. The empirical literature mentioned above
suggests there is a link between NTBs and tariﬀ liberalization and that the net protection
resulting from it might increase or decrease.1 It is this link we wish to investigate and in
particular the combination of industry-speciﬁc characteristics which is associated with it.
Several recent articles have argued that protection is counter-cyclical and that tempo-
rary protection may be used to sustain low cooperative tariﬀ rates (Bagwell and Staiger
(1990, 1995)). The present paper takes a more structural (or long-term) view, but it rests
on the same economic principles as that of Bagwell and Staiger. It is the desire to have
reciprocal trade agreements as well as the unilateral incentive to restrict trade that explains
the emergence of NTBs. Due to terms of trade eﬀects, countries gain by unilaterally restrict-
ing trade. When all countries act in this fashion, they get stuck in a prisoners’ dilemma. A
reciprocal agreement allows them to escape from this trap. Whereas Bagwell and Staiger use
this argument to investigate a country’s incentive over the business cycle, we use it to un-
derstand the combination of industry characteristics under which a particular NTB emerges
and whether, given these characteristics, net protection increases or decreases.
To investigate the link between industry characteristics and NTBs, we simplify two
aspects developed recently by others: the way governments choose trade protection and
the way international cooperation is modeled. This allows us to develop how government
preferences for domestic industries and other industry-speciﬁc variables such as international
transport cost determine both the extent of tariﬀ liberalization and the use of speciﬁc NTBs.
The paper is organized as follows. Some facts about quotas and antidumping are dis-
cussed in the next Section. In Section 3, we present the theoretical model we shall use to
track these observations. In Section 4, we derive the non-cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium and
show that NTBs will not be used. However, countries can gain by bilateral tariﬀ reductions.
In Section 5, we analyze the cooperative tariﬀ and we characterize industries for which tariﬀ
reductions are large or small. Tariﬀ reductions create unilateral incentives to alter the terms
of trade via NTBs. In Section 6, we show that the NTB of choice is a quota (rather than
antidumping), and we analyze the ensuing quota equilibrium. We show that the set of in-
dustries aﬀected by quotas is a subset of those aﬀected by tariﬀs. Moreover, depending on
the industry characteristics, the use of quotas may result in a net increase or decrease in pro-
tection. In Section 7, we suppose that quotas are negotiated away and investigate whether
there is subsequent scope for antidumping laws. The set of industries in which antidumping
constraints are invoked is a subset of those aﬀected by quotas. Section 8 summarizes the
main points of the analysis.
1 Copeland (1990) makes some progress in this direction with a model in which two countries bargain over
the level of a ‘negotiable’ trade instrument, anticipating the subsequent use of a non-negotiable instrument.
He shows that there is some substitution into the less eﬃcient non-negotiable instrument as a result of this
negotiation. However, net protection decreases.
22. Some Facts
Trade liberalization has been impressive since World War II. In the United States, for
example, the average tariﬀ declined by nearly 92% between the First GATT Round of 1947
and the Tokyo Round of 1979 (Bhagwati (1988)). In 1987, the estimates of the Post-Tokyo
Round average tariﬀ rates were 3.3% in the United States, 4.6% in Canada, 4.9% in France
and 6.2% in Japan (Deardorﬀ and Stern (1989)). Impressive as it is, the success of GATT
primarily occurred in developed countries and for manufacturing products. Until recent
years, developing countries have largely eschewed trade liberalization. Similarly, sectors like
agriculture have been mainly outside the scope of the various rounds of trade liberalization.
To link the use of NTBs to trade liberalization in manufacturing, one should look at
the timing of their introduction. Renner (1971) shows that the number of manufacturing
product classes aﬀected by quantitative restrictions more than doubled in Canada and in the
UK between 1963 and 1970, while it increased tenfold in the US. (However, the EC and Japan
registered a decrease in the number of protected product classes.) Even though antidumping
laws have been around for a long time,2 for the period 1980-1986, the number of antidumping
investigations in the world was almost triple that for 1970-1978 and the number of positive
decisions more than tripled (Dale (1980), Table III.1; Finger and Olechowski (1987), Table
A8.3).
Overall, NTBs have replaced tariﬀ barriers in manufacturing sectors. Moreover, quan-
titative restrictions (which emerged during the 1960s) have been gradually replaced by an-
tidumping measures since the 1980s.3 This shift corresponds roughly to the completion of the
Kennedy Round. Today, GATT (1990) notes that “[d]espite a recent decline in the number
of anti-dumping investigations initiated in the United States and the European Communi-
ties, anti-dumping remains (after tariﬀs) the most frequently invoked trade policies in these
countries” (p.10). According to GATT (1995), there were 764 antidumping measures in force
by GATT members in 1994, the highest number ever reported (against 540 measures in force
in 1991). Antidumping measures are now spreading to developing countries. For instance,
most Latin American countries have introduced antidumping legislation or are in the process
of doing so (Nogu´ es (1993)). In the meantime, quantitative restrictions are on the decline:
GATT (1993a) documents (on a country-by-country basis) speciﬁc import quotas, import
licensing restrictions and items subject to import prohibition which have been eliminated
in recent years. It has also been noted that antidumping actions have followed soon after
the expiration of many restraint arrangements involving the US (GATT (1993a)). Signato-
ries of the Uruguay Round agreement are now required to ‘tariﬀy’ existing quotas and put
constraints on their future use.
2 The ﬁrst antidumping law was introduced in Canada in 1904. New Zealand and Australia soon followed
suit. The US adopted its ﬁrst antidumping law in 1916. By 1921, Great Britain and France also had laws
in place (Finger (1993)).
3 This excludes Voluntary Export Arrangements (VEA). According to some estimates, 2/3 of the VEAs
negotiated during the 1980s were installed in response to antidumping actions (The Economist (1991)). On
the relationship between these arrangements and antidumping, see Anderson (1992, 1993) and Rosendorﬀ
(1996).
3Importantly, the gradual replacement of trade tools has also been accompanied by a
reduction of the number of sectors aﬀected by NTBs. Whereas very few products were
traded without levy before the various GATT rounds, Renner (1971) ﬁnds that 7% of the
(4 digit) product classes were aﬀected by quantitative restrictions in the US and in the EC
in 1970. The number of antidumping cases in the EC (initiated and/or ending up with a
positive decision) represents a fraction of this number (see GATT (1993b)). Of course, it
is not because a smaller number of sectors are aﬀected by NTBs that overall protection
necessarily decreases. However, given the high rates of growth in world trade, it seems likely
that, despite this substitution, the overall level of protection has decreased through time.
The links between tariﬀ liberalization and the emergence of NTBs have been investi-
gated empirically with interesting results with respect to industry characteristics. Marvel
and Ray (1983), in particular, show that tariﬀ liberalization is stronger (on average) in indus-
tries that are more competitive and that enjoy higher growth rates. Moreover, Ray (1981)
and Marvel and Ray (1983) argue that NTBs are found predominantly in more competitive
industries because NTBs are better than tariﬀs at shielding rents among existing ﬁrms when
barriers to entry are low. There is much less use of NTBs in less competitive industries as
tariﬀ liberalization has been more modest. Marvel and Ray also argue that there are some
sectors (in both types of industry) in which overall protection has increased as a result of
the emergence of NTBs.
In the next Sections, we investigate the case of quotas and antidumping as devices to
maintain protection when tariﬀs are negotiated away or when international transport costs
get lower. We are interested in developing a model (i) which is consistent with the sequential
introduction of quantitative restrictions and antidumping measures; (ii) where the range of
sectors aﬀected by these tools gets smaller, and (iii) where the degree of tariﬀ liberalization
and the use of NTBs depend on industry characteristics.
3. The Model
In this Section, we describe the various trade policy tools we consider in the sequel,
namely tariﬀs, quotas, and antidumping restrictions, and discuss our modeling strategy.
The interaction between ﬁrms follows the simple reciprocal dumping model of Brander
(1981). There are two ﬁrms, one in each country, selling the same good. Competition between
ﬁrms within each country is described by the Cournot model. The reasons for this choice of
modeling strategy are as follows. In a perfectly competitive world, ﬁrms would never dump
so there would be no role for antidumping measures (see Ethier (1982) for an exception when
uncertainty is introduced). Furthermore, there would be no incentive to use quotas if the
foreigners get the rents from them (see for example Helpman and Krugman (1989), p.14).
Hence to explain the use of quotas and antidumping restrictions in a simple static framework,
we should look for some market imperfection. The most natural one is market power, which
is also the relevant market structure for many manufacturing industries. The basic choices
to model oligopolistic interaction are the Cournot and Bertrand descriptions. The Bertrand
model requires one to consider diﬀerentiated products otherwise there would be neither
imports nor exports. Under quotas, the price equilibria are typically in mixed strategies (see
4for example Krishna (1989)), which are both cumbersome to deal with analytically, as well as
being unappealing to some critics. Therefore we use the Cournot model, which as we show,
is generally manageable, as well as tracking to a fair degree the stylized facts of Section 2.
For simplicity we do not allow for entry, and consider only a two-country, two-ﬁrm case.
Firm 1 is domiciled in country A, in which it sells x1 units of output, while it sells
y1 in country B. Firm 2, domiciled in B, sells x2 in A and y2 in B. There are no marginal
production costs, but the cost of shipping one unit of output abroad is t per unit.
The inverse demands in market A and B are, respectively
pA =1− X;a n dpB =1− Y, (3.1)
where X = x1 + x2 and Y = y1 + y2. If a tariﬀ τA is imposed by government A, the foreign
ﬁrm’s marginal cost for its exports is TA = t + τA; TB and τB are analogously deﬁned. The














These solutions are valid for Ti   [−1, 1
2], (i = A,B). If Ti ≥ 1
2, there is a domestic monopoly
in country i with the rival ﬁrm excluded by too high export cost (and thus the solution is
that of Ti = 1
2). If Ti ≤− 1, the foreign ﬁrm is a monopolist in the domestic ﬁrm’s market.
The equilibrium proﬁts are simply πj =ˆ x2
j +ˆ y2












This model produces reciprocal dumping (Brander and Krugman (1983)) since pA−TA ≤ pB
and pB − TB ≤ pA. That is, each ﬁrm uses third-degree international price discrimination.
Consumer surplus in A is simply
ˆ X2
2 . We assume that tariﬀ revenues are redistributed















A similar expression applies to market B.
The expressions given above will be used in the next two sections to describe the non-
cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium and the cooperative tariﬀ. We show that NTBs will not be
used when tariﬀs are freely chosen, but may be unilaterally desirable when the cooperative
tariﬀ is in place. The two NTBs we consider are quotas and antidumping restrictions.
Suppose then that Government A imposes a quota, ¯ x2 ≥ 0, on the foreign ﬁrm. This
quota is binding if it is less than the Cournot output (see (3.2)) of the foreign ﬁrm in the
domestic market, i.e. if ¯ x2 <
1−2TA
3 ,w h e r eTA is the sum of transport cost and whatever
tariﬀ is currently in eﬀect. The domestic ﬁrm then chooses its Cournot best reply to ¯ x2,
ˆ x1 =
1 − ¯ x2
2
. (3.5)
5Note that a quota in the domestic market has no eﬀect in the foreign market.
The third tool available to each government is an antidumping constraint. Following
Anderson, Schmitt, and Thisse (1995), we model antidumping measures as a binding con-
straint on the aﬀected ﬁrm’s outputs to eliminate the dumping margin, which is the diﬀerence
between the price received on each domestic unit sold and the net price received on each
unit exported. Hence, if Government A imposes an antidumping restriction on the foreign
ﬁrm, then Firm 2’s outputs must ensure that
pA ≥ pB + TA, (3.6)
if Firm 2 is to sell in market A (it may prefer giving up market A and selling only in
market B). The concavity of the proﬁt functions ensures that (3.6) will hold with equality
whenever Firm 2 opts to still serve market A under an antidumping restriction. We assume
that evidence of dumping is determined by a price-based method, which “in the US [...] is
generally based on a foreign ﬁrm’s own home market sale price” (Gallaway, Blonigen and
Flynn (1999)).4
An equilibrium with the restricted ﬁrm (say, Firm 2) serving both markets entails ﬁrst
ﬁnding the x’s and the y’s to the problem
maxx2,y2 π2 =( 1− y1 − y2)y2 +( 1− x1 − x2 − TB)x2, (3.7)
subject to the antidumping constraint (1 − y1 − y2) ≤ (1 − x1 − x2 − TB) and the standard
non-negativity constraints, given that Firm 1’s problem is the standard Cournot one. We
show in Appendix 1 that the eﬀect of an antidumping restriction on Firm 2 is to reduce its
equilibrium output in market A and to increase it in B (Firm 1’s outputs go the other way).
As expected, the equilibrium price rises in A and falls in B.
The ﬁnal ingredient of the model is the description of how trade policies are deter-
mined. We posit a policy-maker’s objective function over consumer beneﬁts (β) and proﬁt
(π), U(β,π), which is strictly increasing in each argument and quasiconcave so the indiﬀer-
ence curves have the standard shape (downward sloping with diminishing marginal rate of
substitution). The standard case of total surplus (β + π) maximization is a particular case
of the above. We also assume that this objective function is applied to each industry sepa-
rately. This assumption is a simple way to allow for diﬀerent trade-oﬀs between consumer
beneﬁts and proﬁts in diﬀerent industries. As we show below, our approach can explain
the observed fact of binding but non-prohibitive quotas, whereas this observation rejects the
simple surplus maximization approach. For the most part, we shall think of a strictly quasi-
concave objective function (and strictly diminishing marginal rate of substitution). In what
follows, we shall make extensive use of a Cobb-Douglas form for the policymaker’s objective
function, U = β1−απα,w h e r eα denotes the relative weight on proﬁt, or the importance of
the domestic ﬁrm to the policymaker.
There are several justiﬁcations for such a form. For example, following Stigler (1971)
and Peltzman (1976), we could think of governments that care about consumer welfare (with
4 See Boltuck and Litan (1991) for a detailed description of the implementation of the US antidumping
law.
6tariﬀ revenues spent, say, on public goods) because consumers vote, and they care about
proﬁt because legislators get perks from lobbyists (and there are diminishing returns to each
argument). In a similar vein, we could imagine, as in Becker (1983), that government policy
is determined by costly lobbying from interested parties. Insofar as greater concessions are
only achieved at the cost of larger lobbying expenditures, a balance will be struck between
the lobbying parties, just as the Cobb-Douglas function tends to select outcomes that are
‘in the middle’ (whereas a linear utility function tends to select more extreme outcomes,
especially under convex constraints). We can think of the outcome of the lobbying game as
the solution to the simpler maximization problem. In adopting U(β,π) to investigate the
choice and the level of the three trade tools available to policymakers, we assume they have
as much freedom in choosing antidumping constraints on an industry-by-industry basis as
they have over tariﬀs and quotas.5
In the sequel, we model a progression through diﬀerent types of policy, with nonco-
operative phases interspersed with trade negotiations which lead to cooperative policies.
However, we assume a certain degree of myopia in the cooperative phases. In particular,
the trade negotiators do not consider how governments may later resort to other policies
that are within the letter of the trade agreement (but contrary to its spirit). For example,
when setting cooperative tariﬀs, negotiators do not anticipate that countries may afterwards
resort to antidumping measures to unilaterally improve their positions. While this approach
is contrary to the spirit of subgame perfection, it does capture the realistic aspect that laws
and agreements typically do not foresee all contingencies. Such loopholes in practice are
typically only closed in later negotiations and once there have been signiﬁcant violations.
There is some evidence that negotiators may be myopic in the above sense. For ex-
ample, Marvel and Ray (1983, p.196) note that their empirical ﬁndings “support the view
that the NTBs actually augmented protection in favored industries”. If a higher level of
protection were unilaterally desirable, it could have been attained through tariﬀs in the ini-
tial non-cooperative equilibrium. Therefore, tariﬀ negotiations would not ultimately lead to
higher protection unless negotiators did not foresee the subsequent use of NTBs. One might
also argue that, if negotiators are aware that countries would want to change say quotas
following tariﬀ negotiations, then these quotas should themselves be part of the negotia-
tions. Historically, tariﬀs were negotiated ﬁrst, without explicit consideration of quotas or
other NTBs. Only in later rounds of negotiation, once quotas had actually proliferated, did
attention turn to them. When the issue of quotas was brought to the negotiating table, it
is unlikely that the parties anticipated the ensuing rise in the use of other NTBs such as
antidumping measures.6
5 For instance, the application of antidumping laws are subject to political inﬂuence. Moore (1992) ﬁnds
empirical evidence that decisions on antidumping cases in the US are partly determined by political variables.
Baldwin and Steagall (1994) reach less strong conclusions but note that commissioners do not have a very
strict interpretation of the law.
6 The Economist (1999) underlines this point well: ‘Countries agreed to lower their blatant barriers to
trade [..] while intervening at will [..] in their domestic economies. [B]y the 1970s, problems began to
emerge. As border barriers fell, it became clear that domestic regulations were also a big impediment to
trade [..]. Moreover, governments began to abuse these loopholes for protectionist ends: antidumping cases
74. The Non-Cooperative Tariﬀ Game
In this Section we describe the Nash equilibrium outcome of the tariﬀ game and the
properties of the equilibrium tariﬀ. We begin by deriving this equilibrium because we want
to establish that NTBs are not used in the non-cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium and because
we will use it as our benchmark equilibrium.
Consider the problem facing the government in A. It has to choose a tariﬀ, τA,t o
maximize U(βA,π 1)w h e r eβA, the sum of domestic consumer surplus and tariﬀ revenue, is
given by (3.4), and π1, which is the total proﬁt earned by the domestic ﬁrm in both countries,
is given by (3.3). The solution is described by a tangency condition between an indiﬀerence
curve in (π1,β A) space and the constraint deﬁned by the set of (π1,β A) pairs attainable
via diﬀerent levels of the tariﬀ. There is also a possible corner solution corresponding to
TA = 1
2, where proﬁt attains its maximum value since the foreign presence is eliminated.










1 − 5TA − 6τA
=
2(1 + t + τA)
1 − 5t − 11τA
, (4.1)
where a prime denotes a partial derivative with respect to τA. From (4.1), the constraint
locus slopes up for τA < 1−5t
11 , so there can never be a maximum of U on this portion. This
is because higher tariﬀs here increase βA, while they increase π1 throughout. Hence the










in which case there is a trade-oﬀ between higher proﬁt and higher consumer beneﬁts (a higher
τA increases proﬁt by squeezing out the rival ﬁrm while decreasing consumer beneﬁts since
consumers pay through higher prices). It is useful to note for what follows that (4.3) implies
that the eﬀective trade barrier TA > 1
11, while TA can be eﬀectively bounded above by 1
2,t h e
value at which the foreign ﬁrm is excluded from the domestic market.7 The solution to the
government’s problem is illustrated in Figure 1, where τA is monotonically increasing as we
move counter-clockwise around the constraint locus. It is readily shown that the constraint
locus is necessarily concave in the relevant range, so the solution obtained from the tangency
condition of the indiﬀerence curve to the constraint is a maximum (and the corresponding
second-order condition holds).
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
and import restricting regulations proliferated. So the focus of trade policy turned to limiting such abuses.’
7 It also follows from (4.2) that τA is necessarily non-negative for t ≤ 1
5.
8The tangency condition is described by the ﬁrst-order condition to the government’s
problem, Uββ 
A + Uππ 
1 =0 ,o r
f(τA,τ B,t) ≡ (1 − 11τA − 5t)Uβ +2 ( 1+t + τA)Uπ =0 . (4.4)
Let τ∗








where the denominator is negative by the second-order condition, and ∂f/∂τB is positive
(see Appendix 2(i)). Hence the reaction functions slope up: tariﬀs are strategic complements
in the non-cooperative game between governments.
The reaction functions are also continuous since the constraint locus is strictly concave in
the relevant region and varies continuously with the other government’s tariﬀ rate, while the
indiﬀerence curves are convex. A non-cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium then exists by Brouwer’s
ﬁxed point theorem since tariﬀs must be eﬀectively chosen from the compact set [ 1
11−t, 1
2−t]
(which stems from the fact that T [ 1
11, 1
2]).8
It is worthwhile at this juncture to point out how the introduction of a quasiconcave
government objective function U is instrumental to the strategic complementarity result. If
instead we assumed that governments maximized the sum of consumer beneﬁts and ﬁrm
proﬁts, the tariﬀ reaction function would be independent of the rival’s choice (there is a
dominant strategy).9 Although the level of social welfare then depends on the rival’s tariﬀ
(through the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt abroad), the optimal tariﬀ does not. However, if the gov-
ernment trades oﬀ consumer beneﬁts with proﬁt in a non-linear fashion, as we are assuming,
the higher the rival government’s tariﬀ, the lower will be the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt, ceteris
paribus. At the margin, the government now wishes to redress the balance in favor of the
ﬁrm and at the expense of consumers, resulting in a higher tariﬀ best reply.
So far we have shown that tariﬀ reaction functions are continuous, upward sloping, and
that they must cross. The symmetry of the governments’ problems then implies that any
equilibrium must be symmetric. We can further show under some further restrictions that
the equilibrium is stable (
dτ∗
A
dτB < 1a tτ∗
A = τ∗




∂τA), and hence unique.
The suﬃcient restrictions we use are that the government preference function is given by the
Cobb-Douglas function, U = β1−απα,a n dα [1
3, 11
16] so that preference weights are not too
extreme. The stability proof under these conditions is given in Appendix 2(ii).10
The reaction functions are sketched in Figure 2, in which we also represent some gov-
ernment indiﬀerence curves.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
8 Equilibrium existence still holds if tariﬀs are constrained to be non-negative: the relevant compact set
for τ is then [0, 1
2 − t].
9 In this case, Uβ = Uπ = 1 and, from (4.4), (1 − 5t − 11τA)+2 ( 1+t + τA)=0 ,s oτ∗
A = 1−t
3 .
10 The stability condition holds generally for t ≥ 1
5; the other restrictions are only used for t<1
5 (see
Appendix 2).
9From Figure 1, a relatively higher weight on ﬁrms in the government objective function
(an increase in α in the Cobb-Douglas formulation) corresponds to an indiﬀerence curve
that tilts more towards the π-axis, and a greater best reply value of π (and lower β). This
is achieved by a higher tariﬀ so tariﬀ reaction functions shift up, resulting in a higher
equilibrium tariﬀ (see also Rosendorﬀ (1996)).
Real transportation costs have declined over the years. The eﬀect of lower transport
costs is to shift the reaction functions upand so to raise equilibrium tariﬀs. A lower transp ort
cost implies a greater foreign presence, ceteris paribus, and thus higher consumer beneﬁts.
Given the trade oﬀ between consumer beneﬁts and proﬁts, each government wants to increase
protection and to exploit the monopoly power of the home market. Moreover, as we show in
Appendix 2(iv), lower real barriers to trade lead to lower eﬀective barriers (and hence more
trade in equilibrium) despite the oﬀsetting eﬀects of the tariﬀ increase. As we will see, the
eﬀect of a change in t has very diﬀerent eﬀects on the cooperative tariﬀ rate. To summarize
(in the sequel, Results apply to the Cobb-Douglas form, while Propositions do not depend
on it):
Result 1:
(i) The more governments weigh proﬁts (higher α), the higher are non-cooperative tariﬀs.
(ii) Lower transport costs bring higher non-cooperative tariﬀs but lower overall trade barriers.
We now show that neither government will further curtail trade on topof the non-
cooperative tariﬀ.
Proposition 1: There is no incentive for a government to use quotas or antidumping
constraints if there is no restriction on tariﬀ use.
Proof: An antidumping constraint or a prohibitive quota may cause the foreign ﬁrm to stop
selling in the home market. A government imposing a prohibitive quota or an antidumping
constraint which eliminates trade cannot prefer this outcome to the optimal tariﬀ because
the tariﬀ could have originally been chosen to be prohibitive. So consider the case where
NTBs do not eliminate trade. Consider ﬁrst a combination of tariﬀ τ0 and a non-prohibitive
binding quota, ¯ x2. The key point is that any quota can be ‘tariﬃed’ to yield a revenue gain:
any quota output can be attained via a tariﬀ τ1(¯ x2)w i t hτ1 >τ 0 (see (3.2)). Imposing τ1
leaves both proﬁt and consumer surplus unchanged from their values at the pair (τ0, ¯ x2), but
tariﬀ revenue must rise since τ1 >τ 0.11 Since τ∗ maximizes U(.), then no other tariﬀ can
be better, and therefore (from the above argument) no tariﬀ-cum-quota can be preferred.
The argument for the antidumping restriction follows the same lines. The only added
element is that an antidumping constraint also changes the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm in the
foreign market. As we noted in the previous Section, and as is shown in Appendix 1, the
output of the restricted ﬁrm rises in its own market. Since a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is decreasing in
its rival’s output in any market, the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm abroad must fall whenever
an antidumping restriction is imposed on top of any tariﬀ. Consider then a combination
of tariﬀ τ0 and an antidumping constraint on Firm 2. An antidumping constraint can be
11 This result relies on the equivalence of tariﬀ and quota in a Cournot game (see Hwang and Mai
(1988)). This also implies that quotas would be as eﬃcient as tariﬀs if quota rights were auctioned oﬀ
by the government.
10replaced by a quota, ¯ x2, leading to the same outcome in the domestic market, as well as the
same proﬁt and consumer surplus there. Since we have just argued that an antidumping
constraint lowers a ﬁrm’s proﬁt abroad, Firm 1’s overall proﬁt must rise when an antidumping
constraint is replaced by a quota yielding the same level of imports. Since a quota can be
tariﬃed to yield a revenue gain, the same argument used above applies here. Hence no
tariﬀ-cum-antidumping constraint can be preferred to τ∗ and there is no combination of
tariﬀ, quota and antidumping constraint that is unilaterally preferred to τ∗.
This proof showcases an important property of the model: tariﬀs are more eﬃcient trade
policy tools than quotas, and quotas are more eﬃcient than antidumping restrictions.12 We
now turn to the properties of the cooperative tariﬀ rate.
5. Cooperative Tariﬀs
The Nash equilibrium tariﬀs just derived leave room for negotiation. This is readily
seen from Figure 2. Both countries can be better oﬀ with lower tariﬀs that increase the
volume of trade and reduce local market power. Tariﬀ negotiation, as in the GATT, is the
manifestation of the realization that lower tariﬀs are better if they are bilaterally binding.
In this Section we look at the common tariﬀ rate that maximizes joint welfare (and
can equivalently be attained through a Nash bargaining solution). The key diﬀerence from
the non-cooperative problem is that the cooperative tariﬀ explicitly accounts for proﬁts
earned abroad. This is the reason it is lower than the non-cooperative tariﬀ rate – a lower
tariﬀ increases proﬁt earned from the foreign market. The common tariﬀ τ∗∗ is given by
maximizing the policymaker’s utility function where the tariﬀ determines β and π (we can
drop the subscripts since the problem is the same for both governments). The ﬁrst-order
condition is
Uββ  + Uππ  =0 . (5.1)
The trade-oﬀ between β and π is determined from the relations (3.4) and (3.3) where T =
TA = TB and τ = τA = τB. The corresponding derivative expressions are
β  =








while β   < 0a n dπ   > 0.
Proﬁt is a
 
-shaped function of τ.F o rτ high enough (such that T ≥ 1
2), the domestic
ﬁrm is a monopolist in its own market. As τ falls below 1
2, the domestic ﬁrm loses out
increasingly through competition from the foreign rival, but also becomes more competitive
in the foreign market. For τ low enough, the latter eﬀect dominates, and proﬁt rises as τ falls:
the domestic ﬁrm is eﬀectively subsidized to produce in the foreign market and eventually
12 Cassing and Hillman (1985) show that a quota may be preferred if revenue enters the objective function
as a separate argument, and when a domestic monopolist faces a foreign competitive fringe.
11drives the foreign ﬁrm out of the foreign market (when T ≤− 1). Conversely, β (consumer
surplus plus tariﬀ revenues) is a
 
-shaped of τ, which is lowest at its extremes. A high
tariﬀ implies a small volume of trade, low tariﬀ revenue and low consumer surplus, while,
for τ low enough, consumer surplus is high but the cost of subsidizing trade dominates. The
construction of the locus of feasible (π, β) combinations (that determines the cooperative
tariﬀ) is rather intricate and is described in Appendix 3.










(marginal rate of substitution equals marginal rate of transformation along the feasible locus).
Substituting (3.4), (3.3) (with T = TA = TB and τ = τA), (5.2), and (5.3), we ﬁnd the






(1 − α)(2 − 2T +5 T2) − α(2 − T)2
(1 − α)(2 − 2T +5 T2) − α(5T − 1)(1 − 2T)
 
. (5.5)
It is helpful to ﬁnd where τ∗∗ = 0. From (5.5), there is clearly a solution τ∗∗ =0f o rt = 1
5.
However, for α>11
20, this is a minimum. The other root to τ∗∗ = 0 is given from (5.5) as
the solution to (1 − α)(2 − 2t +5 t2)=α(2 − t)2,o r
α =
2 − 2t +5 t2
6(1 − t + t2)
, (5.6)
which determines a unique positive relationship between α and t.B o t hl o c iw h e r eτ∗∗ =0
are depicted in Figure 3. The sign of τ∗∗ for any parameter combination is then determined
by considering on which side of the loci t = 1
5 and (5.6) we are (see (5.5)). Below the locus
(5.6), τ∗∗ > 0w h e nt<1
5, and above the locus (5.6), τ∗∗ > 0w h e nt>1
5. The theoretical
result of τ∗∗ < 0 for some parameter values seems unrealistic. In practice, such negative
tariﬀs might be undone by arbitrage: individuals could cross and recross the frontier and
keepcollecting subsidies. 13 In the sequel, we therefore restrict tariﬀs to be non-negative.14
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The other feature of Figure 3 that needs some explanation is the locus such that T = 1
2,
which is the right most curve in the Figure and which corresponds to a cooperative tariﬀ
13 Similar stories are told about trucks crossing borders between EC countries, driving round the round-
about, collecting agricultural subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy, and recrossing the border.
Between Northern Ireland and Eire, this is known as the ‘turnaround pig’.
14 This is actually a little more complex than simply replacing τ∗∗ < 0 by a zero tariﬀ since, given the shape
of the locus of feasible (π, β) combinations, the local maximum positive value of τ∗∗ might be preferred to
free trade. However this happens only when the two sides of the constraint locus are very close. As a result,
the constraint τ∗∗ is zero when the unconstrained τ∗∗ is negative except for a small range of parameters
(α>. 55 and .12 <t<. 2; see Figure 3) where τ∗∗ is strictly positive.
12that eliminates trade, and hence to monopoly in each country. From (5.5), and using τ∗∗ =
1
2 − t ≥ 0, this locus for t>1
5 is given by









Comparing the cooperative and the non-cooperative tariﬀ rates enables us to deﬁne
three types of regions consistent with two-way trade.15 They are deﬁned in Figure 3 by the
pair (τ∗,τ∗∗). In the ﬁrst region, τ∗ is positive but τ∗∗ is zero; in the second region, both τ∗
and τ∗∗ are positive, and in the third region, both τ∗ and τ∗∗ are zero. It is also instructive
to consider the degree of tariﬀ liberalization deﬁned as s =( τ∗−τ∗∗
τ∗ )100. In Figure 3, we
have added the degree of tariﬀ liberalization to the pair (τ∗,τ∗∗), and we have included a
few points where the triple (τ∗,τ∗∗,s) has been computed.
The intuition for the tariﬀ patterns shown in Figure 3 is the following. The model has
two distortions: imperfect competition and relative ineﬃciency of trade due to the presence
of international transport costs. The ﬁrst distortion induces countries to jointly subsidize
trade, while the second one induces them to tax trade. At t = 1
5, the two forces just balance
resulting in τ∗∗ = 0. Consider now a marginal increase in t from 1
5. Consumer beneﬁts
decrease since the equilibrium price increases with less trade. Governments that care about
consumers (low α) then have a tendency to decrease τ∗∗, and thus to subsidize trade (or
retain a zero tariﬀ under a non-negativity constraint). Less trade, however, implies higher
ﬁrm proﬁts. If governments like ﬁrms (high α) they are induced to tax trade. When t<1
5,
governments jointly want to subsidize trade and this helps ﬁrms (since π is convex in τ). It
is only when governments care about consumers (low α) that they tax trade.
Note that there is very little tariﬀ liberalization close to the boundary where the coop-
erative tariﬀ eliminates trade. Indeed, the boundary condition at which trade is eliminated
under cooperative tariﬀ (see (5.7)) is the same as that for the non-cooperative tariﬀ.16 We
also know that every point inside the boundary involves trade under the non-cooperative
tariﬀ equilibrium since we showed in the previous section that the equilibrium total barrier
to trade (T∗ = t+τ∗) is falling with t for the Cobb-Douglas example with α ≥ 1
3.E a c hs u c h
point also involves trade under the cooperative tariﬀ.17 The reason that the boundaries




dβA, where the RHS is given by (4.1) and βA and π1 are given by (3.4) and (3.3). Using symmetry yields
an implicit formula
τ∗ =
(1 − α)(1 − 5T)(2 − 2T +5 T 2)+α(1 + T)(2 − T)2
6{(1 − α)(2 − 2T +5 T 2) − α(1 + T)(1 − 2T)}
. (5.8)
In Figure 3, we have constrained τ∗ ≥ 0.
16 This can be seen by setting τ = 1
2 − t ≥ 0, U = β1−απα, β = 1
8 and π = 1
4 in (4.4).
17 To see this, let ˜ U(τA,τ B) denote country A’s payoﬀs under tariﬀs τA and τB. Then note that ˜ U(τ∗∗,τ∗∗) ≥
˜ U(τ∗
A,τ∗
B) ≥ ˜ U(1
2 − t,τ∗
B) > ˜ U(1
2 − t, 1
2 − t) where the ﬁrst inequality holds by the optimality of the cooper-
ative tariﬀ, the second since τ∗
A is preferred at the non-cooperative equilibrium to a prohibitive tariﬀ, and
the third since A’s payoﬀ is strictly decreasing in B’s tariﬀ. Hence the cooperative tariﬀ involves trade if the
non-cooperative equilibrium tariﬀ entails trade.
13are the same for the non-cooperative and the cooperative tariﬀ equilibria is that, with a
prohibitive tariﬀ (τ = 1
2 − t), a slight bilateral reduction in τ has only a second-order eﬀect
on the proﬁts of the domestic ﬁrm abroad. The incentive to cut tariﬀs marginally is then
the same in the two equilibria. We summarize this discussion with
Result 2: Tariﬀ negotiation does not change the range of trading industries.
Inspection of Figure 3 reveals a number of additional results. The degree of bilateral
tariﬀ liberalization depends on whether t>
<
1
5 and how close we are to the boundary at which
trade is eliminated. We can determine the following properties from Figure 3, which indicate
the degree of trade liberalization by industry type (i.e., (α, t) pair).
Result 3:
(i) A high degree of tariﬀ occurs when governments weigh proﬁts highlyand transport cost
is low (high α and low t).
(ii) A low degree of tariﬀ liberalization despite high non-cooperative tariﬀs occurs when gov-
ernments weigh proﬁts highlyand transport cost is high (high α and t).
(iii) A low degree of tariﬀ liberalization from low non-cooperative tariﬀs occurs when govern-
ments weigh consumers highlyand transport cost is high (low α and high t).
The parameter α is a policymaker’s taste parameter that can be related to several
broader indices. For example, one might expect higher α in sectors where economic activity
is geographically concentrated, so the industry is important to politicians. Likewise, sectors
in decline might be represented by higher α’s in the sense that politicians might be more
sensitive to their continuing prospects; and similarly for more labor intensive industries
insofar as workers vote for politicians. The parameter t is the international transport cost
(as a fraction of the demand intercept), and so high t corresponds to industries for which
the domestic market is much more important than foreign markets. Hence, t is inversely
related to the degree of import penetration in an industry and thus, in this model, with
eﬀective competition.18 Under this interpretation, the results on tariﬀs are in line with the
empirical results discussed in Section 2. In particular, the higher the competition between
ﬁrms (low t), the higher the degree of tariﬀ liberalization. It remains now to see whether
the predictions of the model are also consistent with the use of NTBs.
6. Quotas
Having negotiated the cooperative tariﬀ τ∗∗, and under the understanding that coun-
tries can no longer deviate from this tariﬀ rate, they are likely to look for alternative ways
to inﬂuence the pattern of trade to their own advantage. We restrict the set of possible
instruments to quotas and antidumping restrictions. The following result is a corollary of
the proof of Proposition 1:
18 We have also looked at a model with n domestic and n foreign ﬁrms and calculated equilibrium and
cooperative tariﬀ rates under the assumption that the maximand is social surplus. Results are mixed. The
equilibrium tariﬀ decreases with n while the cooperative one increases, so that the degree of liberalization
falls with domestic concentration. However, it rises with import penetration so that industries with more
competition from imports in the non-cooperative equilibrium would expect more tariﬀ liberalization.
14Proposition 2: Given the cooperative tariﬀ, τ∗∗, if governments can use both quotas and
antidumping restrictions, theywill onlyuse quotas or else no NTBs at all.
The idea behind the result is that an antidumping restriction has the same eﬀect as
a particular quota on the domestic market, but has an additional deleterious eﬀect on the
home ﬁrm’s proﬁt in the foreign market. As we noted in Section 2, quotas were the trade
restriction of choice prior to the completion of the Kennedy Round.
The quota game is of interest in its own right outside the general points we make about
the progression of trade policies. In particular, our policymaker’s objective function approach
yields more appealing results than does a simple social surplus maximization approach. The
latter yields either completely prohibitive quotas or else no quota at all; the reason being
that the locus of (π, β) combinations attainable through quotas is convex.
To see this convexity result, we ﬁrst characterize the Cournot equilibrium in the presence
of a quota. If the quota on Firm 2 is binding, ¯ x2   [0, 1−2T∗∗
3 ]( w h e r eT∗∗ = t + τ∗∗)a n d
Firm 1’s best reply is ˆ x1 = 1−¯ x2
2 (which is also the domestic market price, from Firm 1’s
ﬁrst-order condition). Hence total output in market A is ˆ X = 1+¯ x2
2 and Firm 1’s equilibrium
proﬁt, if it faces a binding quota ¯ y1 in market B, is
˜ π1 =
(1 − ¯ x2)2
4
+¯ y1(
1 − ¯ y1
2
− T∗∗), (6.1)








+ τ∗∗¯ x2. (6.2)
These equations describe a parameterized curve (the parameter being ¯ x2)i n( π, β) space.
To describe the curve, ﬁrst note that ∂˜ π1
∂¯ x2 = −(1−¯ x2
2 ) < 0a n d
∂ ˜ βA
∂¯ x2 =( 1+¯ x2
4 )+τ∗∗,w h i c hi s
necessarily positive for τ∗∗ > −1
4. Since we concentrate on non-negative tariﬀs, the feasible




















Under the standard social surplus maximization, the convex locus necessarily implies either
completely prohibitive quotas or none at all. This is true irrespective of the weight chosen
by the government between consumer beneﬁts and ﬁrm proﬁts.
Clearly, a quasi-concave policymakers’ objective function over consumer beneﬁts and
ﬁrm proﬁts might alleviate this problem by generating non-prohibitive quotas in addition to
prohibitive quotas and no quotas at all. We now show that there exists an equilibrium to
the quota game and, furthermore, that any equilibrium is symmetric.
To see this, note ﬁrst that the strategy space for each government is [0, ˆ x(τ∗∗)]. It suﬃces
then to show that the quota reaction functions slope up (strategic complementarity) and that
any jumpis a jumpup(the game is sup ermodular). This means that the reaction function
15for a government must cross the 450 degree line, and by symmetry of the reaction functions
around the 450 line, the only possible equilibria are symmetric. Strategic complementarity
follows if ∂2U
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The ﬁrst expression on the RHS is positive since
∂ ˜ βA
∂¯ x2 > 0a n d∂˜ π1
∂¯ x2 < 0( f o rτ∗∗ > −1
4).
The second is positive since it is smallest at ¯ y1 =ˆ x2 = 1−2T∗∗
3 ,a tw h i c hv a l u ei ti se q u a lt o
1
6(1 − 2T∗∗) which is positive since T∗∗ < 1
2, or else there is no trade in the ﬁrst place.











when this derivative is evaluated at ¯ x2 =¯ y1 =¯ q. For the Cobb-Douglas government payoﬀ
function, the resulting equation is
(1 − α)(1 + ¯ q +4 τ∗∗)[1 − ¯ q2 − 4(t + τ∗∗)¯ q] − α[(1 + ¯ q)2 +8 τ∗∗¯ q](1 − ¯ q)=0 , (6.7)
which is a cubic with at most three real roots. Any root outside [0, ˆ x2(τ∗∗)] is irrelevant.
Hence, the candidate symmetric equilibrium is any relevant root or else one of the endpoints.
We only ever found one interior solution, if any.19 Figure 4 illustrates the ﬁndings for the
equilibrium quota given the cooperative tariﬀ τ∗∗ (constrained to be non-negative). As
expected, depending on parameter values, there are three types of symmetric equilibria: no
quantitative restrictions (¯ q =ˆ x); binding quotas (0 < ¯ q<ˆ x), and prohibitive quotas (¯ q =0 ) .
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Clearly, given t, tighter quotas are associated with higher values of α. However the
interaction between α and t also plays an important role. In particular, high values of t are
associated with lower degrees of tariﬀ liberalization which decreases the need for quotas even
if α is high. Comparing Figures 3 and 4, interesting patterns emerge.
Result 4: Quotas are not necessarilylinked to high degrees of tariﬀ liberalization.
19 To check that any candidate solution is a symmetric equilibrium, we used the solution to calculate the





1−α with U evaluated at the candidate symmetric solution. We
next calculated the equation for the feasible quota locus, βC(π). We then subtracted βC from βI for all
possible π consistent with choice of any quota between 0 and ˆ x2.I no r d e rf o r¯ q∗ to be an equilibrium, then
βI −βC ≥ 0 for all possible values of π (corresponding to alternative quota choices by Government A). The
same procedure was used to check whether (0,0) or (ˆ x2, ˆ x2) is an equilibrium.
16Large declines in tariﬀs clearly bring quotas (for instance, when t is low and α is high).
But small declines in tariﬀs can also lead to the use of quotas. This is the case when t is not
too high near the locus that eliminates trade, where little tariﬀ liberalization occurs.
Result 5: Quotas applied on top of the cooperative tariﬀ, τ∗∗, can lead to a net trade expan-
sion eﬀect or to a net decline in trade as compared to the non-cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium.
Indeed there exist industries (i.e., (α,t) combinations) where no quotas are used even
though τ∗∗ <τ ∗. In such sectors, trade liberalization leads to trade expansion. For this
to happen, low α is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition. In particular, high feasible
values of α and t may imply no quotas as well. In other industries (high α and low t), quotas
are prohibitive, increasing protection with respect to τ∗.20 When quotas are binding, it can
be easily shown that, for most (α, t) pairs, the combined eﬀect of ¯ q and τ∗∗ results in an
increase in trade as compared to τ∗. It is only near the border separating the prohibitive
from the binding quotas that protection increases with quotas.
Figure 4 also has something to say about decreases in transport cost t.
Result 6: Lower t not onlymaylead to quotas but mayalso lead to stricter quotas under
the cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium.
Result 6 is immediate from inspection of Figure 4. If α and t are high, the equilibrium
involves no quotas. Lower t, however, may bring binding, and even prohibitive, quotas. This
contrasts with the non-cooperative tariﬀ equilibrium where lower t never leads to quotas.
Result 7: The set of industries in which a quota is used is a subset of the industries in
which the non-cooperative tariﬀ was positive.
Although positive non-cooperative tariﬀs are used over much of the parameter space,
once they are reduced through cooperative agreements, quotas will be applied to a substan-
tially smaller set of industries. Hence, tariﬀ liberalization, even though it may bring quotas
for some industries, will be eﬀective over most of the parameter space. This result depends
on our assumption that quota rents are lost to foreign ﬁrms. If instead quotas were licensed
oﬀ, using the logic of Hwang and Mai (1988), then quotas would be set so as to return to
the eﬀective tariﬀ rate τ∗ and the set of industries aﬀected would be unchanged. We now
investigate how antidumping measures may be applied after quantitative restrictions.
7. Antidumping Measures
Quotas have been used less frequently over the recent years. In large part this is due
to constraints placed by GATT. As shown in the previous Section, a government would
always prefer quotas to antidumping constraints. In this Section, we investigate whether the
government would choose antidumping constraints if quotas were no longer available as a
policy tool. One restriction on the use of quotas is a bilateral agreement not to use them, and
return to the cooperative tariﬀ alone. We consider here whether antidumping measures are
imposed when τ∗∗ is in place. We assume that antidumping restrictions are never violated if
20 The Italian quota on Japanese automobiles (2,000 cars per year), and the prohibition to import certain
types of vessels in the US are well-known examples of (quasi) prohibitive quotas.
17imposed.21 One interpretation is that violation of such a constraint would incur prohibitive
penalties.22
Under an antidumping constraint, the restricted ﬁrm may either want to withdraw
from its export market or else serve it without dumping. As shown in Appendix 1, the
equilibrium involves the restricted ﬁrm selling in both markets when T∗∗ is low enough.
When T∗∗ is large, the equilibrium involves the restricted ﬁrm selling only in its domestic
market competing there with the other ﬁrm (the other ﬁrm being a monopolist at home).23
We begin by establishing two important implications of the model. If the quota equi-
librium involves no quotas, then the best reply to no quota is no quota. This means that no
quota is preferred to any binding quota, and we showed in Proposition 1 that an antidump-
ing constraint is equivalent to a quota plus a loss to domestic ﬁrms in the foreign market.
Thus, antidumping will never be used in response to no antidumping and no antidumping
will be used if quotas were not optimal when they could be used. Hence, we can state that
if the quota equilibrium involves no quotas, then no antidumping constraint will be used.
The contra-positive to this last statement is:
Proposition 3: If an antidumping constraint is desired, then the equilibrium to the quota
game must involve binding quotas.
This last proposition is important since it implies that the use of antidumping measures
necessarily occurs for a subset of the parameter values (α,t) (for the Cobb-Douglas example)
where a binding quota is used. Hence, the model exhibits not only a progression from tariﬀs
to quotas and to antidumping, but the implication of this progression is that the set of (α,
t) over which a particular trade tool will be used will shrink with this progression.
21 We have not explicitly considered the implications of the foreign ﬁrm violating the antidumping con-
straint. In our equilibrium, the constraint is binding with equality so that the domestic ﬁrm could, if it
wished, increase its home output slightly, reducing the domestic price and leading to a violation. And the
domestic ﬁrm would wish to do this if it could thereby gain (as in Fischer (1992)). On the other hand, if
there is no direct beneﬁt to the domestic ﬁrm (for example, the foreign violator is ﬁned or an antidumping
duty kicks in) then there is no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategies described in the text.
22 See Fischer (1992) for an analysis of antidumping penalties when violation is only imperfectly observable.
An alternative interpretation of the antidumping constraint is that a ﬁrm that violates (3.6) is hit with an
antidumping duty to bring its price into line. Then the ﬁrm would face a duty (D) equal to the dumping
margin pA−pB−TA and it would then be able to set the duty to zero by driving the dumping margin to zero. It
would always want to do this (conditional on still selling in A) because its proﬁt is π2 =( pA−D−TA)x2+pBy2,
with the D = pA − pB − TA ≥ 0. Substituting the equation determining D into π2 yields π2 = pB(x2 + y2).
Since this expression is increasing in x2 (pB being independent of x2), then Firm 2 would always want to
increase x2 so far as to render D equal to zero. But this is equivalent to facing the antidumping constraint.
23 There is a small gap between the values of T ∗∗ for which the equilibrium entails the restricted ﬁrm
trading and not trading (i.e., Tu <T ∗∗ <T l; see Appendix 1). In this range, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium for ﬁrms. This is because when T ∗∗ <T l, the restricted ﬁrm wants to export to market A if we
start from a situation in which Firm 1 is a monopolist in A and there is duopoly competition in B. However,
to satisfy the antidumping constraint, Firm 2 must increase its domestic output to lower the price in B. In
a Cournot game, Firm 1 responds by reducing y1 and the equilibrium, conditional on Firm 2 selling in both
markets, has lower y1.W h e nT ∗∗ >T u, it then pays Firm 2 to give up its export market and sell only at
home. There is, of course, a mixed strategy equilibrium for T ∗∗   (Tu,T l). However, since this range is very
small with respect to the entire parameter space, and since there are more interesting features of the model,
we shall ignore this range.
18We now determine the set of parameter values in the Cobb-Douglas example for which
one country wishes to impose an antidumping constraint given the presence of the cooperative
tariﬀ τ∗∗. We show in Appendix 1 that an antidumping constraint either causes the foreign
ﬁrm to abandon its export market (if T∗∗ >T l ≈ 0.175), or to still serve both markets (for
T∗∗ <T u ≈ 0.168). In the latter case there are still imports in the protected market but at
a much lower level since p∗ = p − T∗∗.
The regions of the parameter space for which either country prefers to invoke an an-
tidumping constraint (given the other does not) are shown by regions I and II in Figure 4:
in region II, the constraint still involves bilateral trade, while the foreign ﬁrm is eﬀectively
debarred in region I.24 These two regions depend on T∗∗ and thus on τ∗∗.I n r e g i o n I I ,
τ∗∗ =0 ,w h e r e a sτ∗∗ is either zero or takes a low positive value in region I. The incentive
to introduce antidumping measures is thus only consistent with intermediate values of T∗∗.
When T∗∗ is low, the dumping margin is too low to compensate for the distortionary eﬀect
of an antidumping constraint. When T∗∗ is high (for high t), the foreign ﬁrm responds by
discontinuing exports. This creates a monopoly at home and a signiﬁcant loss in consumer
beneﬁts that for intermediate values of α cannot be oﬀset by the resulting increase in do-
mestic ﬁrm proﬁt. Given these individual incentives, there is clearly an equilibrium without
antidumping measures outside these two regions (subject to the caveat of note 23). Inside
the regions, equilibrium involves one or both countries using the constraint, or else a mixed
strategy equilibrium in constraints.25 Whatever the outcome, trade is signiﬁcantly curtailed.
Inspection of Figure 4 yields the following results:
Result 8:
(i) Antidumping measures maybe not used even when quotas would be prohibitive.
(ii) Antidumping measures that eliminate trade maybe used when the quota equilibrium
involves positive binding quotas, or prohibitive quotas.
Obviously, the desire to introduce antidumping constraints is present over a small subset
of the parameter space as compared to quotas. This is due to the fact that antidumping
restrictions have a strong negative eﬀect on the domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁt from export. This
lowers signiﬁcantly the domestic authorities’ incentive to introduce such a constraint.
8. Conclusions
In this paper we have taken a simple view of how the pattern and the degree of protec-
tionism have evolved. The analysis is based on a model of governments that resolve trade-oﬀs
between surpluses of various interest groups. We have taken a broad view that clearly ne-
glects many of the details of particular industries. The model still aﬀords a characterization
24 Cases where antidumping constraints eliminate trade have been noted in the literature. Hansen and
Prusa (1995) cite the case of imports of Mexican fresh-cut ﬂowers in the United States decreasing by 98%
following antidumping action and Braga and Silber (1993) discusses the case of imports of Brazilian frozen
concentrated orange juice in Australia.
25 For example, it is straightforward (but lengthy) to show that the equilibrium in region I involves both
countries imposing antidumping constraints. Note also that, in region II, there cannot exist an equilibrium
in pure strategies at which both countries impose a constraint and both ﬁrms trade.
19of how diﬀerent industries are aﬀected by the various waves of protectionism. This allowed
us to track the stylized facts quite well.
First, governments have no incentive to use quotas or antidumping restrictions when
they unilaterally choose from a menu of trade policies that includes tariﬀs. However, once
tariﬀs are set cooperatively, governments may then wish to introduce NTBs. Second, if
they have the choice, policymakers prefer quotas to antidumping restrictions. Antidumping
constraints may be used only when the use of quotas is suﬃciently restricted. Third, the
set of parameter values over which non-cooperative tariﬀs are positive is wider than that
where quotas are used which, in turn, is wider than for antidumping restrictions. Hence, the
model exhibits both a progression from non-cooperative tariﬀs to quotas and antidumping
restrictions, and a convergence to freer trade as each trade tool is associated with a smaller
set of parameter values where it will be used. Fourth, as shown in the empirical literature,
net protection may increase in some sectors and decrease in others.
Clearly, without knowledge of the empirical distribution of industries over the parameter
space, the model cannot predict whether tariﬀ liberalization will ultimately lead to a net
expansion or a net contraction in aggregate trade. However, the model suggests that tariﬀ
liberalization will be associated with an overall trade expansion despite the endogenous
emergence of NTBs for a relatively even distribution of industries over the parameter space
(α, t). There is thus no law of constant protection in this model.
Interesting results at the industry level have also been obtained about the links between
the degree of tariﬀ liberalization and the use of NTBs. In particular, the highest degrees
of tariﬀ liberalization are associated with low values of t a n dh i g hv a l u e so fα.I t i s a l s o
in this region that the endogenous replacement by NTBs is the strongest, particularly with
quotas. If one interprets low t as reﬂecting high competition especially from abroad, the
model predicts a strong degree of replacement, and even overshooting, between NTBs and
tariﬀs for more competitive industries (that governments are sensitive about). By contrast,
when competition within an industry is lower (t is higher), tariﬀ liberalization is lower,
and the endogenous response of NTBs is in general more modest and even nonexistent with
antidumping: NTBs serve to partially oﬀset tariﬀ liberalization and, in some cases to increase
net protection. These predictions are in line with the empirical evidence, especially that of
Marvel and Ray (1983). These authors also ﬁnd that NTBs are predominantly found in
more competitive industries. Our explanation for this result is that trade is eﬃcient in such
industries, which induces governments to jointly set a low cooperative rate. This creates a
strong incentive for individual countries to use NTBs, especially if governments weigh ﬁrm
proﬁts quite heavily.
The model is simple and some of its features are instrumental to the results while others
are not. The international duopoly framework simpliﬁes the analysis. While there are many
highly concentrated industries where NTBs have been used (steel, semi-conductors, tapered
roller bearings; see Nieberding (1999) for an analysis at the ﬁrm level for some of these
industries), our main results do not depend on a duopoly market structure. In particular,
both the progression of trade instruments and the narrowing of aﬀected industries should
hold with an arbitrary number of domestic and foreign ﬁrms since, for a Cournot game
among ﬁrms, these results depend only on the nature of the trade instruments. However,
20the results may be sensitive to the model of strategic interaction among ﬁrms. Cournot
rivalry implies that quotas are equivalent to tariﬀs and this is helpful to get the progression
of trade tools. Had we assumed Bertrand rivalry, the equivalence of tariﬀs and quotas would
no longer hold and it is possible that quotas would be used in addition to tariﬀs at a non-
cooperative equilibrium; however antidumping would still be less eﬃcient than quotas. A
possible extension of the present model would be to work with a more elaborate model of
government preferences and in particular with one involving trade oﬀs in consumer surplus
across industries. Still, the present model provides a useful benchmark which allows for
interior solutions with NTBs and that captures well the stylized facts reviewed in Section
2. Our analysis also suggests that, even if future rounds of negotiations succeed in curbing
the use of antidumping measures, other tools, possibly even less eﬃcient than antidumping
restrictions, are likely to emerge.
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24Appendix 1: Antidumping
An antidumping measure by A forces Firm 2 either to satisfy the constraint in order to
sell in A, or else to stopexp orting to A. We derive the p arameter values under which each
of these two cases arises.
i) Antidumping with trade: Firm 2’s problem is
maxx2,y2 π2 =( 1 −y1−y2)y2+(1−x1−x2−T)x2 s.t. 1−y1−y2 ≤ 1−x1−x2−T. (8.1)
Firm 1 solves its unconstrained Cournot problem. The solution to this game is x2 = 1−5T
3 ,
y2 = 1+4T
3 , x1 = 2+5T
6 , y1 = 2−7T
6 with π2 =2 ( 1− y1 − y2)2 = 2
9(2 − 4T − 3y1)2.T h i si sa n
equilibrium if Firm 2 does not prefer to deviate and sell in F only, given Firm 1’s outputs x1
and x2 above. Firm 2’s proﬁt if it sells only in F is
(1−y1)2
4 .G i v e ny1 = 2−7T
6 , Firm 2 ﬁnds
it more proﬁtable to trade (i.e., 2
9(2−4T −3y1)2 >
(1−y1)2





Using (3.2), note that x1 + x2 < ˆ x1 +ˆ x2 <y 1 + y2, so that an antidumping measure
introduced by A decreases total output in A and increases total output in B. Moreover,
y2 > ˆ y2 (= ˆ x1)a n dx2 < ˆ x2: an antidumping restriction on Firm 2 reduces its sales to A
and increases them in B (Firm 2’s domestic market).
ii) Antidumping without trade: Firm 2’s problem is to maximize π2 =( 1− y1 − y2)y2
with respect to y2. (Firm 1’s problem is the same as above.) Hence, y2 =
1−y1








in B and is a monopolist (x1 = 1
2) in A. This is an equilibrium if Firm 2 has no incentive to
deviate and satisfy the antidumping constraint given the outputs sold by Firm 1 when Firm
2 does not trade. Solving problem (8.1) given y1 = 1−2T
3 and x1 = 1
2, π2 =
(7−2T)2
288 .T h i si s
less than
(1+T)2




Appendix 2: Comparative Statics of the Noncooperative Tariﬀ Model
The comparative static properties follow from (4.4).






(1 − 2TB)(β 
AUβπ + π 
1Uππ), (8.2)
which is necessarily positive since TB < 1
2, β 
A < 0, π 
1 > 0, while Uβπ ≥ 0a n dUππ < 0.





∂f/∂τA and the denominator is
negative by the second-order condition.
(ii) Next, consider the stability of the tariﬀ equilibrium, τ∗. The stability condition holds
if the reaction function has slope less than unity at τ∗ = τA = τB;t h a ti s−
∂f/∂τB



























25We shall show that each expression in square brackets is negative. The ﬁrst one reduces to
−11Uβ+2Uπ < 0. Given the ﬁrst-order condition (4.4), or (1−5T∗−6τ∗)Uβ+2(1+T∗)Uπ =0 ,







1 − 5T∗ − 6τ∗
2(1 + T∗)
. (8.4)
Cross multiplying, and recalling T∗ = τ∗ + t, this reduces to 2 + t>0, which necessarily
holds since t ≥ 0.
Now consider the second term in square brackets in (8.3). This is clearly negative
(recalling the sign pattern given after (8.2), along with Uββ < 0) for T ≥ 1
5, and thus for
t ≥ 1
5 (see (4.3)). For t<1
5, we use the Cobb-Douglas form under the restriction α ≥ 1
3 as


































from the ﬁrst-order condition (4.4), we can substitute and take out a factor
β 
A
9βAπ1 < 0f r o m




)(1 + T)+1 2 T +(
1 − α
α
)(10T − 2) > 0. (8.7)
The LHS of (8.7) is increasing in T, so consider the lowest possible value of T, T = 1
11.
The LHS then takes the value 12(2A +1− 1
A), where A ≡ α
1−α > 0. This expression is
non-negative as long as 2A2 +A−1 ≥ 0, which clearly holds for A ≥ 1
2, and thus for α ≥ 1
3.
(iii) We now show that dτ∗
dt < 0. Since any equilibrium is necessarily symmetric, (4.4)

























The denominator is negative by (ii) above, so it suﬃces to show that ∂f/∂t < 0. Evaluating

































26The ﬁrst square bracketed expression is negative by an argument similar to that used in (ii):







1 − 5T∗ − 6τ∗
2(1 + T∗)
, (8.11)
which reduces to τ∗ < 1, and holds since T∗ ≤ 1
2.
Thus it suﬃces that the second term in parentheses in (8.10) be non-positive. First
note that the term (−2+T −6τ) < 0s i n c e6 τ ≥ 1−5T>−2+T, where the ﬁrst inequality
follows from the condition β 
A ≤ 0, and the second from the condition that T ≤ 1
2. Hence,
for 10T −2 ≥ 0( o rt ≥ 1
5, as in part (ii)), the term is indeed non-positive. Again in parallel
to (ii), we invoke the Cobb-Douglas form with α ≥ 1
3 to prove the case t<1
5 and T<1
5.








(10T − 2)β 
A +( −2+T − 6τ)π 
1
π1βA








Using (8.6), and pulling out a factor 2








A(10T − 2) < 0, (8.13)
or
A(1 + T)(−2+T − 6τ)+( 1− 5T − 6τ)(5T − 1) < 0, (8.14)
(where we recall A ≡ α
1−α). Since the LHS of (8.14) is decreasing in A, it must hold for all
A ≥ 1
2 (equivalently, α ≥ 1
3) if (8.14) holds at A = 1
2, i.e., if
(−4+1 9 T − 49T2)+6 τ(1 − 11T) < 0. (8.15)
The ﬁrst term (in parentheses) is necessarily negative because T ≤ 1
5 for the case under
consideration. For the second term, we know (1 − 11T) < 0 by (4.3), and, since t<1
5 for
the case under consideration, τ ≥ 0 by (4.2).
(iv) Lastly, we show dτ∗
dt > −1, so that, in conjunction with (iii), tariﬀs replace transport
costs, but not completely. The expression for dτ∗










where the ﬁrst two terms on the LHS are given by (8.3) and the last one is given by (8.10).
Putting these together allows us to write (8.16) as
−2Uβ +( 1− 2T)[Uβββ 
A + Uβππ 
1] < 0. (8.17)
Once again, we can use the Cobb-Douglas form and the ﬁrst-order condition (8.6) to rewrite








27The LHS is increasing in A ≡ α
1−α, so that if it holds at A = 2, corresponding to α = 2
3,i t
holds for all α ≤ 2
3. The suﬃcient condition is then (substituting in for π1 and π 
1):
−(1 + T)2 − (1 − 2T)2 +2 ( 1− 2T)(1 + T) < 0. (8.19)
It is easy to check that this expression reduces to −(9T)2 which is necessarily negative as
T ≥ 1
11. It can be shown that (8.18) also holds for 2
3 ≤ α ≤ 1
16 provided that T is greater
than 1
11. Using (5.8), T∗ > 2
5 in this range, a suﬃcient condition for (8.18) to hold.
Appendix 3: Feasible (π, β) Combinations for Cooperative Tariﬀ Case
The value t = 1
5 forms a boundary between the main cases, so we begin by describing
the (π, β) locus for that value. For t = 1
5, if one graphs π and β as functions of τ,t h ef o r m e r
is minimized at τ = 0 whereas the latter is maximized there, and both are symmetric. This
means that in (π, β) space, the feasible combinations comprise a linear segment (given by
π =
4−10β
11 ) with one end anchored where τ = 0 (see Figure A.1). As τ rises, we move back
up the locus to the point corresponding to τ = 3
10 (T = 1
2) at which trade stops at domestic
monopoly. Likewise, as τ falls from zero, we move back up the same locus, stopping where
the subsidy is suﬃciently great that the consumer beneﬁts shrink to zero (τ = −27
50). (The
subsidy can go upto τ = −6
5 or T = −1 at which point the domestic ﬁrm wipes out the
foreign ﬁrm in the foreign ﬁrm’s market.) Superimposing the indiﬀerence curve map will
then lead to either a solution with τ∗∗ = 0 (for ‘steep’ indiﬀerence curves, or α ≤ .55 in the
Cobb-Douglas example), or else a solution where the policymaker is indiﬀerent between a
strictly positive tariﬀ and a strictly negative one. The highest value of τ∗∗ (given t = 1
5)i s
attained at α = 11
16,a tw h i c hpo i n t T = 1
2 and so the foreign ﬁrm is debarred. For α = 11
16
(the highest value we consider), the optimal negative tariﬀ is τ∗∗ = − 3
10.
[Insert Figures A.1 and A.2 about here]
For t>1
5, the graphs of β and π against τ show that β is maximized at a higher value
(τ = 1−5t
11 ) than the value of τ that minimizes π(τ = 1
5 − t). The resulting feasible set of
(π, β) pairs is given in Figure A.2, from which it is clear that the optimum for t>1
5 must
involve β  < 0a n dπ  > 0 along the locus LM (hence τ>1−5t
11 , although it is not necessarily
positive). The diagram also shows the direction of increasing τ around the feasible locus.
This implies that higher values of α yield higher values of τ.
For t<1
5,a r g m a xβ(τ) < argmin π(τ) so that the feasible locus has the same shape
as in Figure 4 but counter-clockwise movements around it now correspond to decreasing τ.
Note that the constraint locus is concave throughout in both cases. Hence, there is a unique
point (the global maximum) that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (5.1) together with β  < 0
and π  > 0f o rt>1
5,a n dβ  > 0a n dπ  < 0f o rt<1
5. However the ﬁrst-order condition
may also pick up local maxima (on the dominated part of the locus) or local minima.
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